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GRM: Utility-Aware Jailbreak Attacks on Audio LLMs via Gradient-Ratio Masking

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) enable spoken interaction but introduce new jailbreak vulnerabilities. Existing perturbation-based jailbreaks do not explicitly control which frequency bands carry the perturbation.

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2026
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arxiv.org/abs/2604.09222ARXIV-DEFAULT
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Abstract

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) enable spoken interaction but introduce new jailbreak vulnerabilities. Existing perturbation-based jailbreaks do not explicitly control which frequency bands carry the perturbation. Although such perturbations can elicit unsafe responses, repeatedly applying a universal perturbation across diverse inputs may also degrade utility on normal tasks, leaving a conspicuous behavioral footprint that may expose the attack to users or automated monitoring systems and thereby compromise its stealthiness. To determine whether full-band perturbation is necessary, we vary coverage from partial-band to full-band. Jailbreak Success Rate (JSR) varies non-monotonically, while utility degradation grows with coverage. This mismatch shows that selected bands can yield stronger attacks with less utility degradation than full-band perturbations. Based on this observation, we propose GRM, a utility-aware, frequency-selective jailbreak framework that ranks Mel bands by the ratio between jailbreak contribution and transcript sensitivity, confines a universal perturbation to selected bands, and regularizes deviations from the intended request semantics. Experiments on four ALLMs show that GRM achieves an average JSR of 88.46% while substantially reducing utility degradation across benign transcription and response tasks relative to baselines. Our code is available at this repository. Warning: This paper contains potentially sensitive content.