AI "personality clones" force a re-examination of personal identity in operational terms. Setting aside the hard problem of consciousness, we approach identity through the indiscernibility of manifestations, as assessed by an observer over a duration. We distinguish three criteria that "identity" conflates: fidelity to a target person, generic human-likeness, and individuality. We propose a six-term factorization of observed identity (substrate, dispositions, memory, update dynamics, context, exogenous contingencies), with a state-space formulation. Indiscernibility is defined as one minus a judge's distinguishing advantage, and the factorization's coefficients become local sensitivities estimable by randomized ablation. The central claim is a conditional conjecture: given hypotheses about the agent's information on its own persistence and about consequences bearing on its own stakes, versionability tends to degrade long-horizon indiscernibility. An analogy with lambda-calculus, linear typing, and bisimulation clarifies what linearity does and does not establish. Between product-clone and individual we identify a third object, the delegate: a task-limited, bounded-lifespan partial clone ending in a bandwidth-limited testament. We map the empirical literature onto the three criteria, propose an experimental program, and argue that the correct long-horizon criterion is not trajectory fidelity but climate fidelity: matching the conditional distribution of a person's possible responses. The best clone is the one that diverges from the original as the original would have diverged from itself.
Identity from the Outside: A Conceptual Framework and Research Program for AI Personality Clones
AI "personality clones" force a re-examination of personal identity in operational terms. Setting aside the hard problem of consciousness, we approach identity through the indiscernibility of manifestations, as assessed by an observer over a duration.
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- arxiv.org/abs/2608.11225CC-BY-4.0
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