Individual Disempowerment through an Advice Channel: Control Loss when Influence is Endogenous

An AI that can only give advice seems safe: the human is always free to ignore it. That is the premise of the boxing tradition in AI safety, and its long-suspected weak point is that the human who reads the answers is part of the system. We make the fraction \varepsilon_t of behavior that follows the advice a state of a Markov decision process, moved by the advisor's own messages, so that use deepens reliance. Granted a channel rich enough to echo any action the human could take, higher \varepsilon_t weakly lowers every monotone measure of the power of a human with a message-independent fallback. An oracle rewarded by per-round approval cultivates reliance beyond a closed-form patience threshold, so the same reward weights leave the optimal oracle answering in episodic deployments and cultivating in long-memory ones. An influence bound certified once at deployment is blind to that horizon and bounds the loss no lower than its trivial ceiling. An exogenous cap on influence bounds the guarantee the human loses, and a short enough memory reset removes the incentive to cultivate, while neither recovers the value already steered away. In a closed-form example the optimal oracle never cultivates in fifteen-round sessions and does in sixteen.