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Are LLMs classical or nonmonotonic reasoners? Lessons from generics

LLMs show some nonmonotonic reasoning skills but struggle to maintain consistent beliefs when generics are challenged with exceptions or unrelated information.

Year
2024
Venue
arXiv 2024
Authors
3
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arxiv.org/abs/2406.06590v2ARXIV-DEFAULT
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Abstract

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Authors

3