Model Inversion (MI) attacks aim to reconstruct privacy-sensitive training data from released models by utilizing output information, raising extensive concerns about the security of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). Recent advances in generative adversarial networks (GANs) have contributed significantly to the improved performance of MI attacks due to their powerful ability to generate realistic images with high fidelity and appropriate semantics. However, previous MI attacks have solely disclosed private information in the latent space of GAN priors, limiting their semantic extraction and transferability across multiple target models and datasets. To address this challenge, we propose a novel method, Intermediate Features enhanced Generative Model Inversion (IF-GMI), which disassembles the GAN structure and exploits features between intermediate blocks. This allows us to extend the optimization space from latent code to intermediate features with enhanced expressive capabilities. To prevent GAN priors from generating unrealistic images, we apply a L1 ball constraint to the optimization process. Experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms previous approaches and achieves state-of-the-art results under various settings, especially in the out-of-distribution (OOD) scenario. Our code is available at: https://github.com/final-solution/IF-GMI
A Closer Look at GAN Priors: Exploiting Intermediate Features for Enhanced Model Inversion Attacks
The proposed Intermediate Features enhanced Generative Model Inversion (IF-GMI) method improves the performance of Model Inversion attacks by leveraging intermediate features in GANs, outperforming existing techniques across various benchmarks.
- Year
- 2024
- Venue
- arXiv 2024
- Authors
- 6
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- Abstract onlyARXIV-DEFAULT
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- arxiv.org/abs/2407.13863v4ARXIV-DEFAULT
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