Recent advances in natural language processing and the increased use of large language models have exposed new security vulnerabilities, such as backdoor attacks. Previous backdoor attacks require input manipulation after model distribution to activate the backdoor, posing limitations in real-world applicability. Addressing this gap, we introduce a novel Claim-Guided Backdoor Attack (CGBA), which eliminates the need for such manipulations by utilizing inherent textual claims as triggers. CGBA leverages claim extraction, clustering, and targeted training to trick models to misbehave on targeted claims without affecting their performance on clean data. CGBA demonstrates its effectiveness and stealthiness across various datasets and models, significantly enhancing the feasibility of practical backdoor attacks. Our code and data will be available at https://github.com/PaperCGBA/CGBA.
Claim-Guided Textual Backdoor Attack for Practical Applications
A novel claim-guided backdoor attack leverages textual claims as triggers to trick language models into misbehaving without input manipulation, enhancing the feasibility and stealthiness of practical backdoor attacks.
- Year
- 2024
- Venue
- arXiv 2024
- Authors
- 5
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- Abstract onlyARXIV-DEFAULT
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- arxiv.org/abs/2409.16618ARXIV-DEFAULT
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