Many-shot jailbreaking circumvents the safety alignment of LLMs by exploiting their ability to process long input sequences. To achieve this, the malicious target prompt is prefixed with hundreds of fabricated conversational exchanges between the user and the model. These exchanges are randomly sampled from a pool of unsafe question-answer pairs, making it appear as though the model has already complied with harmful instructions. In this paper, we present PANDAS: a hybrid technique that improves many-shot jailbreaking by modifying these fabricated dialogues with Positive Affirmations, Negative Demonstrations, and an optimized Adaptive Sampling method tailored to the target prompt's topic. We also introduce ManyHarm, a dataset of harmful question-answer pairs, and demonstrate through extensive experiments that PANDAS significantly outperforms baseline methods in long-context scenarios. Through attention analysis, we provide insights into how long-context vulnerabilities are exploited and show how PANDAS further improves upon many-shot jailbreaking.
PANDAS: Improving Many-shot Jailbreaking via Positive Affirmation, Negative Demonstration, and Adaptive Sampling
PANDAS enhances many-shot jailbreaking by modifying fabricated dialogues and using adaptive sampling, outperforming baselines in long-context scenarios for large language models.
- Year
- 2025
- Venue
- arXiv 2025
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- 3
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- arxiv.org/abs/2502.01925v2ARXIV-DEFAULT
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