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Foot-In-The-Door: A Multi-turn Jailbreak for LLMs

Ensuring AI safety is crucial as large language models become increasingly integrated into real-world applications.

Year
2025
Venue
arXiv 2025
Authors
4
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arxiv.org/abs/2502.19820v3ARXIV-DEFAULT
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Abstract

Ensuring AI safety is crucial as large language models become increasingly integrated into real-world applications. A key challenge is jailbreak, where adversarial prompts bypass built-in safeguards to elicit harmful disallowed outputs. Inspired by psychological foot-in-the-door principles, we introduce FITD,a novel multi-turn jailbreak method that leverages the phenomenon where minor initial commitments lower resistance to more significant or more unethical transgressions. Our approach progressively escalates the malicious intent of user queries through intermediate bridge prompts and aligns the model's response by itself to induce toxic responses. Extensive experimental results on two jailbreak benchmarks demonstrate that FITD achieves an average attack success rate of 94% across seven widely used models, outperforming existing state-of-the-art methods. Additionally, we provide an in-depth analysis of LLM self-corruption, highlighting vulnerabilities in current alignment strategies and emphasizing the risks inherent in multi-turn interactions. The code is available at https://github.com/Jinxiaolong1129/Foot-in-the-door-Jailbreak.

Authors

4