Jailbreaking attacks can effectively induce unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs); however, the transferability of these attacks across different models remains limited. This study aims to understand and enhance the transferability of gradient-based jailbreaking methods, which are among the standard approaches for attacking white-box models. Through a detailed analysis of the optimization process, we introduce a novel conceptual framework to elucidate transferability and identify superfluous constraints-specifically, the response pattern constraint and the token tail constraint-as significant barriers to improved transferability. Removing these unnecessary constraints substantially enhances the transferability and controllability of gradient-based attacks. Evaluated on Llama-3-8B-Instruct as the source model, our method increases the overall Transfer Attack Success Rate (T-ASR) across a set of target models with varying safety levels from 18.4% to 50.3%, while also improving the stability and controllability of jailbreak behaviors on both source and target models.
Guiding not Forcing: Enhancing the Transferability of Jailbreaking Attacks on LLMs via Removing Superfluous Constraints
A framework to improve the transferability of gradient-based jailbreaking attacks on large language models significantly boosts attack success rates and controllability across different models.
- Year
- 2025
- Venue
- arXiv 2025
- Authors
- 5
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- Abstract onlyARXIV-DEFAULT
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- arxiv.org/abs/2503.01865ARXIV-DEFAULT
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