0

Are You Getting What You Pay For? Auditing Model Substitution in LLM APIs

The paper evaluates existing techniques for detecting model substitutions in LLM APIs, highlighting the limitations of output-based methods and the potential of hardware-based solutions.

Year
2025
Venue
arXiv 2025
Authors
4
Hosting
Abstract onlyARXIV-DEFAULT

Cite

Notes

Only stored in your browser.

Attribution

Abstract & full text
arxiv.org/abs/2504.04715ARXIV-DEFAULT
TL;DR
Semantic Scholar
Attribution policy →

Abstract

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

Authors

4