Despite rapid progress in MLLMs, visual spatial reasoning remains unreliable when correct answers depend on how a scene would appear under unseen or alternative viewpoints. Recent work addresses this by augmenting reasoning with world models for visual imagination, but questions such as when imagination is actually necessary, how much of it is beneficial, and when it becomes harmful, remain poorly understood. In practice, indiscriminate imagination can increase computation and even degrade performance by introducing misleading evidence. In this work, we present an in-depth analysis of test-time visual imagination as a controllable resource for spatial reasoning. We first study when static visual evidence is sufficient, when imagination improves reasoning, and how excessive or unnecessary imagination affects accuracy and efficiency. To support this analysis, we then introduce AVIC, an adaptive test-time framework with world models that explicitly reasons about the sufficiency of current visual evidence before selectively invoking and scaling visual imagination. Finally, to further learn this gating and planning behavior without any annotation of when and how much to imagine, we introduce AVIC-R, which trains the policy via GRPO from QA-correctness rewards and penalties by imagination cost. Across spatial reasoning benchmarks (SAT, MMSI) and an embodied navigation benchmark (R2R), our results reveal clear scenarios where imagination is critical, marginal, or detrimental, and show that selective control can match or outperform fixed imagination strategies with substantially fewer world-model calls and language tokens. Our AVIC-R surpasses strong proprietary baselines including GPT-4o and GPT-4.1 while invoking the world model less often. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of analyzing and controlling test-time imagination for efficient and reliable spatial reasoning.
When and How Much to Imagine: Adaptive Test-Time Scaling with World Models for Visual Spatial Reasoning
Despite rapid progress in MLLMs, visual spatial reasoning remains unreliable when correct answers depend on how a scene would appear under unseen or alternative viewpoints.
- Year
- 2026
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- arXiv 2026
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- 17
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- 7
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- arxiv.org/abs/2602.08236ARXIV-DEFAULT
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